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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
All facts contained in the Statement of Facts are referenced to the proceedings
below. The cited record of proceedings below shall be referred to in the following
manner:
References to the Record Pleadings and Entries at Numbered Pages of the Record
Index

(RL at
References to the Official Trial Transcript

A.

(T. at

)
)

Nature of the Case
This appeal arises from a final Judgment and Decree, and from rulings on motions

for Summary Judgment, and to Amend Pleadings entered by the Third District Court of
Summit County, State of Utah, arising from Appellant's Complaint to adjudicate a real
property boundary and declare the respective property interests of the Parties.
B.

Course of Proceedings
On May 30, 2001, Appellants/Plaintiffs Thomas E. Brown and Marilyn R. Brown

(hereinafter "the Browns") commenced an action against Lee Jorgensen and other
unknown defendants (hereinafter "Jorgensen"), by filing a Complaint which sought to
quiet title in a certain parcel of real property located in Summit County, Utah (hereinafter
referred to as the "Subject Property"). For a description of the Subject Property see
Complaint at RI 0001-0006. On June 14, 2001, Jorgensen answered the Browns'
Complaint, and filed a Counterclaim which sought to quiet title in the Subject Property
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in 12 Jorgensen's favor. During the pendency of the action, the Parties filed motions for
Summary Judgment and Partial Summary Judgment under theories of Boundary by
Acquiescence and Record Title, respectively. On April 6, 2002, the Court, Judge Robert
K. Hilder presiding, granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Browns on the
third and fourth prongs of the boundary by acquiescence standard. (See Ruling and
Order, RI at 0281-0284.) The matter proceeded to trial on the remaining elements, and
was tried to the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck, without a jury, on the 31 st day of March,
2004, and the 1st day of April, 2004.
C.

Disposition in the Court Below
At the conclusion of the Trial, Judge Lubeck granted a judgment awarding the

Subject Property to Jorgensen. The Trial Court's decision is contained in its
Memorandum Decision (see RI at 0481-0492) a copy of which is included in the
Addendum. On June 14, 2004, the Browns filed a Post-Trial Motion to Amend the
Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence, which motion was denied by the Trial Court, the
Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck presiding, on July 15, 2004, (see RI at 0565-0568). On
August 2, 2004, the Trial Court entered formal Findings of Fact, the Judgment (see RI at
0569-0573); a copy of which is included in the Addendum.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Browns are the record owners of a parcel of real property located in

Summit County, Utah, and which is more particularly described as set forth in the
Complaint (hereinafter referred to as the "Brown Parcel"). (See also Trial Exhibits, RI
0479-0480.)
2.

The Browns formally took title to the Brown Parcel in 1971 (T. at 89 line

13-16); however, the Brown Parcel had been continuously in the Brown Family since at
least the 1940's. (T. at 90 lines 19-21.)
3.

Jorgensen is the record owner of certain real property located adjacent to

the Brown Parcel in Summit County, Utah, and which is more particularly described in
the Complaint and Trial Exhibit 5 (hereinafter referred to as the "Jorgensen Parcel"). (T.
at 15.)
4.

Jorgensen and his partner, Dean W. Rowell, originally acquired record title

ownership of the Jorgensen Parcel in 1979. (T. at 14-16.)
5.

In 1986, Jorgensen's partnership with Dean W. Rowell was dissolved, at

which point Jorgensen became the sole owner of the Jorgensen Parcel. (T. at 15.)
6.

Located near the northeastern border of the Jorgensen Parcel is a fence

which runs in a southeasterly direction roughly along the southern border of the Brown
Parcel (hereinafter referred to as the "Fence"). (T. 93 lines 12-22.)
7.

Sometime between 1943 and 1946, Appellant Thomas E. Brown and other
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family members assisted their father with the construction of the Fence (T. at 93), which
was originally composed of cedar posts, netting, and barbed wire. (T. at 91.)
8.

Although some of the Fence is located on the Brown Parcel, the Fence

crosses the Jorgensen Parcel and in so doing separates the Subject Property from the
Jorgensen Parcel. The Subject Property is an area of approximately 6.94 acres of land
and consists of a strip running westerly along the Fence for more than 1900 feet to which
Jorgensen has record ownership but Browns' claim by doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence.. (Trial Exhibit 7; T 112 lines 10-16)
9.

Since the time of its original construction, the Fence has been maintained,

repaired, and improved, but has continually remained in the same basic position and
location. (T. at 73-76, 94, 97.)
10.

The Fence has at all times since its creation been visible from

either the Brown Parcel or the Jorgensen Parcel, though at various points it might have
been leaning downward or covered by sagebrush in certain places. (T. at 22, 23, 51, 5355, 59, 65, 69, 71, 73-76, 100, 101, 167, 168.)
11.

The Browns have always considered the Fence to be the true and correct

boundary line and possessory demarcation between the Brown Parcel and the Jorgensen
Parcel. (T. 94, 117; Trial Exhibit 15.)
12.

In conjunction with this belief, the Browns have used the Subject Property,

for farming, pasturing, and other agricultural purposes, for the grazing of livestock and
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for the raising and harvesting of crops, for family recreation and improvements of the
property. (T. 72, 94, 95, 96, 97, 113, 114, 115.)
13.

There is also an irrigation ditch located on the Subject Property which the

Browns have consistently maintained, culverted, and improved. (T. at 95, 114.) Neither
Jorgensen nor his predecessor Tracy Wright ever used the irrigation after Fence was
constructed. (T. 34, 302.)
14.

From the date the Fence was originally constructed in 1943 or 1946 until

July of 1999, neither Jorgensen nor any of his predecessors in interest claimed or
attempted to claim possession or occupation of the Subject Property. (T. 17, 18, 19, 34,
101,302,304,305.)
15.

From the date of original construction of the Fence in 1943 or 1946 until

twenty years later (1966), Browns and their predecessors occupied the Subject Property
without objection or challenge of such occupation, use and possession. (T. 17, 18, 19, 24,
101,109,119.)
16.

From the time Jorgensen purchased the Jorgensen Parcel in April

of 1979 until July of 1999, a period of more than twenty years, Jorgensen voiced no
objection to the Browns' continued use, occupancy and possession of the Subject
Property. (T. 24 lines 10-20; 89 lines 2-12.)
17.

In 1971, the Browns or their building contractor engaged the firm of Bush

and Gudgel to prepare a metes and bounds site plan of the Brown Parcel to construct a
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house. (T. at 107 to 120 and particularly 119, and Trial Exhibit 6.)
18.

The 1971 Bush and Gudgel site plan (Trial Exhibit 6) was not a survey and

it was not prepared for the purpose of identifying the record property lines of the Brown
Parcel and it specifically did not make any reference to the Fence. (T. at 108, 119.)
19.

The Browns did not understand that the Bush and Gudgel site plan (Exhibit

6) showed a property line different from the Fence originally constructed in the 1940fs,
and the Browns continued to use, occupy and possess the Subject Property. (T. 108.)
20.

In or about 1994, and in anticipation of possibly selling a portion of his

property, Jorgensen commissioned a diagram of the Jorgensen Parcel by Wally France.
(T. 16-17.) This was not a survey. (T. 258-261.)
21.

The 1994 diagram commissioned by Jorgensen was not a survey, but was

scaled off of an aerial photo (T. 260.)
22.

Wally France showed Browns the 1994 diagram, and that the diagram

showed the property line cutting through Brown's home. Brown concluded that the
survey must be erroneous, which it was later shown to be. (T. 102, 103; 258-261; Trial
Exhibit 8, a copy of which is included in the Addendum.)
23.

Despite the results of the 1994 diagram, and despite Jorgensen's newly

discovered knowledge that the Fence was not the record boundary line between the
Brown Parcel and the Jorgensen Parcel, it was not until July of 1999, approximately five
(5) years after commissioning the 1994 diagram, and more than twenty (20) years after
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acquiring ownership of the Jorgensen Parcel, that Jorgensen for the first time voiced
objection to the existence and location of the Fence. (T. at 87-89.)
24.

In or about July of 1999, more than 20 years after first acquiring ownership,

Jorgensen drafted and delivered a note to the Browns informing the Browns that the
Fence had been improperly built on the Jorgensen Parcel, and instructing the Browns to
remove the Fence. (T. at 29, 88-89; Trial Exhibit 21.)
25.

The 1999 Jorgensen letter was the first communication between the Parties

regarding the Fence, and was the first time Jorgensen had ever voiced objection to the
existence of the Fence and its suggested presence on the Jorgensen Parcel. (T. at 89.)
26.

After receiving the 1999 letter, the Browns immediately contacted

Jorgensen in an attempt to resolve the dispute. (T. at 88-89.)
27.

In response to Jorgensen's letter, the Browns commissioned a survey

of the Brown Parcel in the Fall of 1999, the results of which confirmed that Jorgensen's
1994 survey was erroneous, but also showed that the Subject Property was according to
the record a part of the Jorgensen Parcel. (T. at 112.
28.

Thereafter, the Browns filed this action to quiet title to the Subject Property

in themselves under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. (See Complaint at RI
0001-0006.)
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29.

After trial, the Trial Court found that the Browns had satisfied three of the

four required elements of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence; however, the Trial
Court rendered a judgment in favor of Jorgensen based upon a finding of lack of mutual
acquiescence. (Memorandum Decision RI at 0490).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Trial Court should have granted the Browns' Motion to Strike

Jorgensen's Affidavit in Opposition to the Browns' Motion for Summary Judgment. The
Jorgensen Affidavit was legally insufficient because it did not comply with Rule 56(e) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, the Trial Court was in error to consider the
Jorgensen Affidavit, and summary judgment should have been granted in favor of the
Browns.
2.

The Trial Court erred by holding that there was no mutual acquiescence in

the Fence as the boundary between the Brown Parcel and the Jorgensen Parcel. The
Fence was originally created as a boundary between the properties, and has been
recognized as such by the parties, their predecessors and others in the community since
that time. The evidence showed no objection by Jorgensen's predecessors between 1943
or 1946 and 1966, and use of the land up to but not beyond the Fence by both owners thus
mutual acquiescence was established for that period. Moreover, Jorgensen failed to
object to the existence or location of the Fence until more than twenty (20) years after
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acquiring ownership of the Jorgensen Parcel. Thus, mutual acquiescence was established
for this period also. Therefore, the Browns have satisfied the second element of the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
3. The Trial Court erred by holding upon Judgment that the Fence separating the
Brown Parcel from the Jorgensen Parcel did not satisfy the first element of the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence. The Fence was a clearly visible monument or structure, and
the parties at all relevant times considered the Fence to be the true boundary line between
the Brown Parcel and the Jorgensen Parcel. Therefore, the Trial Court should have found
after trial that the Browns had established the first element of the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence.
4.

The Trial Court should have granted the Browns' Motion to Amend the

Pleadings to include the issue of prescriptive easement. In this case the evidence
necessary to establish the existence of a prescriptive easement is substantially the same as
was required to prove boundary by acquiescence. As such, both issues were inherently
and simultaneously tried before the Trial Court, and Jorgensen failed to object at any time
to the introduction of the prescriptive easement issue during those proceedings.
Moreover, because the issues of prescriptive easement and boundary by acquiescence are
so similar, the merits of the action would have been subserved and Jorgensen would have
suffered no surprise or prejudice. Therefore, the Trial Court should have granted
Plaintiffs' motion and amended the pleadings to conform to the evidence of a prescriptive
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easement.
5.

The Judgment of the Trial Court is invalid to the extent that it awards

Jorgensen a judgment of costs. In Utah, a party claiming his costs must within five days
after the entry of judgment file with the trial court a duly verified memorandum of costs
pursuant to Rule 54(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Jorgensen failed to
comply with this requirement; a fact acknowledged by Jorgensen in his Reply
Memorandum to his Motion for Summary Disposition. As such, the Judgment of the
Trial Court is invalid in this regard.
6.

The Judgment of the Trial Court is invalid to the extent that it purports to

adjudicate all claims of all other persons who may claim by, through, or under the
Browns. The doctrine of claim preclusion bars a Trial Court from adjudicating claims
over which it has not acquired subject matter jurisdiction, and which are different from
those already adjudicated in a prior proceeding. As it stands, the Judgment of the Trial
Court violates the doctrine of claim preclusion, and is invalid to the extent that it does so.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE BROWNS5 MOTION TO STRIKE JORGENSEN'S AFFIDAVIT IN
OPPOSITION TO THE BROWNS5 MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, AND SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE BROWNS WAS PROPER ON THE
FIRST AND SECOND ELEMENTS OF THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY
BY ACQUIESCENCE.
The Trial Court erred by admitting or considering Jorgensen's Affidavit in
-16-

Opposition to the Browns' Motion for Summary Judgment, and by refusing to grant
summary judgment in favor of the Browns. In Utah, it has been clearly established that
summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, affidavits, and other submissions of the
parties show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah
1983); UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c). An affidavit filed in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment must set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence. Dairy
Product Services v. City ofWellsville, 2000 UT 81, ^[54, 13 P.3d 581; Norton, 669 P.2d at
859; UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(e). An affidavit that contains mere conclusory allegations which
are unsupported by a statement of relevant surrounding facts, is legally insufficient to
preclude summary judgment. Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
2001 UT 25, ]f36, 21 P.3d 198; Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181,
1186 (Utah 1989). The Jorgensen Affidavit contains Jorgensen's personal opinions,
conclusions, and speculations as opposed to allowable specific statements of fact as
mandated by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Jorgensen Affidavit also violates
several of the Utah Rules of Evidence by offering information that is neither relevant to
the issue of boundary by acquiescence, nor admissible under the rules of hearsay. It is for
these reasons that Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike should have been granted and the Jorgensen
Affidavit should have been stricken by the Trial Court; and, thus summary judgment
should have been granted in favor of the Browns.

-17-

A.

The Affidavit Of Lee Jorgensen Filed In Opposition To The Browns9 Motion
For Summary Judgment Should Have Been Stricken Because It Fails To
Comply With Rule 56(e) Of The Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure,
The Affidavit of Lee Jorgensen (the "Jorgensen Affidavit") filed on January 18,

2002, in opposition to the Browns' Motion for Summary Judgment fails to comply with
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and is, therefore, inadmissible.
Generally speaking, "an affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must
set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence in order to show that there is
a genuine issue for trial." Dairy Product Services, 2000 UT at ^[54, 13 P.3d at 594
(emphasis added); Norton, 669 P.2d at 859; See UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(e). An affidavit that
contains "mere conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation of
relevant surrounding facts, [is] insufficient to preclude...summary judgment." Franco,
2001 UT at 1{36, 21 P.3d at 208; Chapman, 784 P.2d at 1186; see also Dairy Product
Services, 2000 UT at ^{54, 13 P.3d at 594 (stating that "[a]n affidavit that merely reflects
the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions is insufficient to create an issue of
fact"). The Norton case is helpful in this analysis.
In Norton, the Plaintiff filed suit claiming damages as a result of a car accident
with the Defendant. Norton, 669 P.2d at 857. During the proceedings, the Plaintiff filed
an affidavit in opposition to the Defendant's motion for summary judgment wherein the
Plaintiff attempted to assert allegations of fraud or misrepresentation. Id. The trial court
held that the Plaintiffs affidavit was not admissible in evidence because it was legally

-18-

insufficient and therefore, could not be considered on summary judgment. Id. at 859.
The court reasoned that the Plaintiffs statements were largely conclusory in form, and
that they did not state with sufficient specificity the facts supporting the Plaintiffs
allegations. Id.
In the instant case, the Jorgensen Affidavit is replete with the affiant's opinions,
conclusions, and speculations as opposed to containing specific statements of fact as
required by Rule 56(e). The Jorgensen Affidavit ( a copy of which is included in the
Addendum) states that Jorgensen "owns and holds fee simple record title" to the property
in dispute. (RI 0114, f 2.) This statement is wholly conclusory in nature, and purports to
assert a claim that was and remains to be the very issue in dispute between the Parties,
and which was then undecided by the Trial Court. Indeed the facts supported a finding
that the Browns had acquired title to the Subject Property prior to Jorgensen ever
acquiring title to the Jorgensen Parcel. The Jorgensen Affidavit also states that "the fence
remnants appeared to be meaningless" (RI 0116, ^ 12), and that "Brown had been
endeavoring to obliterate all traces of the old Ditch Road." (RI 0117, \ 19.) These
statements are based on Jorgensen's personal opinion, are conclusory in nature, and are
unsupported by any statements of fact as required by Rule 56(e). The Jorgensen Affidavit
states that "the fact the old fence remnants included net wire strongly suggests the old
fences were intended for sheep control - perhaps to keep sheep grazing in the area..." (RI
0119, ^f 25.) These statements are speculative in nature, and are pure conjecture created
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by Jorgensen. As such, they are inadmissible under Rule 56(e) as they are unsupported by
specific factual statements, and/or the affiant's personal knowledge. The Jorgensen
Affidavit further states that "[t]he Ditch Road's access from the Brown Canyon
highway...is the most valuable part of Affiant's Property..." (RI 0119, f 28.) This
statement is also composed entirely of Jorgensen's opinion, and is unsupported by facts of
any nature.
In addition to the foregoing, the Jorgensen Affidavit also contains numerous
statements that run contrary to the Utah Rules of Evidence, making them inadmissible
under Rule 56(e). Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that "[e]vidence which
is not relevant is not admissible." Relevant evidence "means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." UTAH
R. EviD. 401. In reference to the Jorgensen Parcel (not the Subject Property), the
Jorgensens' Affidavit states that Brown "has never operated livestock on the Property nor
leased it for grazing..." and that Brown "gave permission...to persons unknown to the
Affiant for use of the Property for grazing livestock." (RI 0116, f 11.) The Jorgensen
Affidavit also states that "[a]ll real property taxes related to the Property...have been paid
by [Jorgensen]." (RI at 0119, If 29.) These statements are entirely irrelevant to the
subject matter of this action, as they contribute nothing to the various elements of the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is not
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concerned with the payment of property taxes, nor does it give credence to unknown
persons who might have used property the ownership of which is not in dispute. As such,
these statements are not admissible into evidence as they have no tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
any more or less probable.
The Jorgensen Affidavit is also inadmissible as it contains a significant amount of
hearsay. Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
UTAHR. EVID.

801. Generally speaking, hearsay is inadmissible. UTAHR. EVID. 802. In

the Jorgensen Affidavit, Jorgensen states: (1) that he "was..informed by a person...that
such survey stakes marked the Property's Northeast boundary line..." (RI 0114, ^ 5)
(emphasis added); (2) that he "was assured by agents...that these old fence remnants were
all within the Property..." (RI at 0115, f 8) (emphasis added); (3) that he "was advised
efforts might be taken by Brown to build a fence cutting off access up the old Ditch
Road..." (RI 0116, % 14) (emphasis added); (4) that he was "informed that...Brown
erected a...fence along the Brown's Canyon highway..." (RI 0117, f 16) (emphasis
added); and (5) that he had been "advised...that the downhill flat portion [the Jorgensen
Property] had been used...as a lambing area." (RI 0119,125) (emphasis added). Each
evidentiary assertion listed above is based upon declarations of someone other than
Jorgensen while that person was not testifying at trial, and each was offered into evidence
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to prove the truth of the matter which it asserts. Moreover, Jorgensen's knowledge of the
truth or falsity of these statements is speculative at best, and none of these assertions is
supported by factual evidence of any kind. As such, these statements constitute hearsay,
run contrary to Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and are, therefore,
inadmissible.
For the foregoing reasons, the Jorgensen Affidavit fails to comply with Rule 56(e)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It should, therefore, be stricken from the record,
and be held inadmissible in connection with Jorgensen's opposition to the Brown's
Motion for Summary Judgment. Absent the assertions of the Jorgensen Affidavit,
Summary Judgment should have been granted in favor of the Browns.

B.

The Browns9 Motion For Summary Judgment Should Have Been Granted
Because The Trial Court Improperly Admitted And Considered The Affidavit
Of Lee Jorgensen Filed In Opposition To The Browns9 Motion For Summary
Judgment.
Because the Trial Court improperly admitted and considered Lee Jorgensen's

Affidavit in Opposition to the Browns' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Browns'
Motion for Summary Judgment should have been granted. Generally speaking, summary
judgment is proper "if the pleadings, affidavits, and other submissions of the parties show
that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Norton, 669 P.2d at 859; UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c). When a
trial court's decision to grant summary judgment is being reviewed, the trial court's legal
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Court did consider the Jorgensen Affidavit despite its legal deficiencies and fallacies, the
Trial Court's subsequent denial of the Browns' Motion for Summary Judgment was
improper. For these reasons, summary judgment should have been granted in favor of the
Browns on all four elements of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
II.

THE PURPOSE AND EXISTENCE OF THE FENCE, COMBINED WITH
JORGENSEN'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE FENCE OR PROVE
THAT HIS PREDECESSORS OBJECTED TO THE FENCE,
ESTABLISHES THE PARTIES' MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN THE
FENCE AS THE BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN THE BROWN PARCEL
AND THE JORGENSEN PARCEL.
The Trial Court was incorrect in concluding after trial that the Browns had not

established mutual acquiescence in the Fence as the boundary line between the Brown
Parcel and the Jorgensen Parcel. Mutual acquiescence in a line as a boundary requires
that both parties recognize the specific line, and that both parties acquiesce to the line as
the boundary. Mason v. Loveless, 2001 UT App 145, f 19, 24 P.3d 997; Wilkenson
Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, 1999 UT App 366, ^[8, 993 P.2d 229. Mutual
acquiescence is a highly fact-dependent question, and may be established by a party's
silence, or by a party's failure to object. RHN Corp., 2004 UT at f25,96 P.3d at 941; see
also Mason, 2001 UT App at f20, 24 P.3d at 1004. Despite his knowledge of the Fence,
and despite the Browns' open and notorious use of the Subject Property up to the Fence
line, Jorgensen failed to object to the location of the Fence for twenty consecutive years.
This being the case, Jorgensen's acquiescence in the Fence as the true boundary marker is
implied by his conduct. Moreover, the Brown Family's use of the Subject Property from
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also Lane v. Walker, 505 P.2d 1199, 120 (Utah 1973) (stating that "the test to establish
the boundary by acquiescence necessarily need not be based on mutual intent.") (internal
quotations omitted). As such, acquiescence may be established by a party's silence, or by
"the failure of a party to object to a line as a boundary." RHN Corp., 2004 UT at ^[25, 96
P.3d at 941; see also Mason, 2001 UT App at ^[20, 24 P.3d at 1004; Lane, 505 P.2d at
1199 (stating that u[a]cquiescence is...synonymous with 'indolence,' or 'consent by
silence'"). The Mason case lends itself well to this analysis.
In Mason, the Plaintiffs and the Defendants were adjoining landowners. Mason,
2001 UT App at ^[2-8, 24 P.3d at 1000. A fence comprised of cedar posts, barbed wire,
and netting separated the Plaintiffs' property and the Defendants' property. Id. at f 8. The
fence had been erected at least sixty years prior to the time the Plaintiffs and Defendants
acquired their respective parcels. Id. at f21. The Plaintiffs and their predecessors
believed the fence marked the boundary line between the two properties and treated it as
such by grazing livestock up to, but not beyond, the fence. Id. at ^[5. As it was, however,
the fence did not mark the true boundary line between the properties, but extended far
into the Defendants' parcel, providing the Plaintiffs with a portion of the Defendants'
property upon which to graze their livestock. See Id. at ^[6. At one point in time, a survey
was conducted which revealed to the Defendants the location of the true property line
between the parcels. Id. Despite the survey results, however, neither the Defendants nor
their predecessors objected to the existence of the fence, or the Plaintiffs' use of the
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the Jorgensen Parcel. The Browns originally built the Fence for the purpose of
establishing a common boundary between the Brown Parcel and what is now the
Jorgensen Parcel. (T. 94.) Moreover, the Browns have always perceived and treated the
Fence as the true boundary line between the Brown Parcel and the Jorgensen Parcel (Id),
as have others in the area. (T. 42.) The Browns' original purpose behind the construction
of the Fence, combined with their continued efforts and actions to maintain and use the
Subject Property up to the Fence, show that the Browns have, at all times, believed the
Fence to be the true property line separating the Brown Parcel from the Jorgensen Parcel.
Jorgensen's acknowledgment of the Fence, though less apparent, is equally
established. Jorgensen acquired ownership of the Jorgensen Parcel and knowledge of the
Fence line in 1979 (T. 14-16, 23), yet he voiced no objection to the existence or location
of the Fence until 1999 - a period of twenty consecutive years. (T. 89.) The fact that
Jorgensen thought he had discovered the true property line in the 1994 is a relevant factor
in this analysis, but it is by no means dispositive on the issue of mutual acquiescence. See
Wilkenson, 1999 UT App at | 1 3 , 993 P.2d at 232 (stating that "knowledge of the true
boundary is relevant to a determination of whether a party acquiesced in a particular line
as the boundary"); see also Mason, 2001 UT App at f 19, 24 P.3d at 1004. The Trial
Court, in its Memorandum Decision, stated that "[if Jorgensen] believed and acquiesced
in the notion that the Fence was the boundary, he would not have commissioned a
survey...[t]hat act, though not conveyed directly to [the Browns], shows a lack of
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communicate its non-acquiescence to the other party in interest to be valid in defeating a
boundary by acquiescence claim. "[Rjecord property owners are not required to take legal
action or otherwise "oust" someone adversely occupying their property to maintain their
legal rights in their property. They must only take some action manifesting that they do
not acquiesce or recognize the particular line, e.g. a fence, as a boundary between the
properties.55 Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, 44 P.3d 781 at ^[20. If Mr. Jorgensen really
thought the Subject Property was his all along, as he now claims, why did he allow the
Browns to continue to occupy it? Why did he say nothing to the Browns for over twenty
(20) years? Fairness and the substantial policy behind the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence mandate that this Court reject the trial court's analysis and continue to
require the direct communication of non-acquiescence to the other party in interest in
order to defeat a boundary by acquiescence claim.
Finally, after obtaining the 1994 diagram results and discovering that the Fence did
not constitute the true boundary line between the properties, Jorgensen still voiced no
objection to the Browns as to their ongoing use of the Subject Property for an additional
five (5) years, but instead remained entirely impartial and silent only to object to the
existence of the Fence when he again desired to sell the Jorgensen Parcel in 1999.
"[Acquiescence] may also be shown by silence, or the failure of a party to object
to a line as a boundary.55 RHN at ^[25. By inference any objection must be communicated
or evidenced to the opposing or affected property owner by word or deed. Jorgensen5 s
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parties acknowledged a fence line as a boundary on the fact that '[tjhere [was] no
indication in the record that any predecessor in interest behaved in a fashion inconsistent
with the belief that the fence line was the boundary'). This especially holds true where
the owner is deceased and unable to testify." RHN Supra at ]f26.
The facts in the Dahl case are very similar to the facts in the case before the Court.
In Dahl, the Plaintiffs and Defendants owned adjacent parcels of land. Dahl, 2004 UT
App at %2, 101 P.3d at 831. The Plaintiffs parents had originally acquired the Plaintiffs
parcel of land in 1923, and subsequently transferred ownership of said parcel to the
Plaintiffs. Id. at \2. The Defendants did not acquire their parcel until 1998. Id. From
approximately 1925 to 1965, a fence stood between the two parcels, and traversed land
that was contained in the legal description of the Defendants' parcel. Id. at ^3. During
this time, the property owners regarded the fence as the true boundary line, despite the
fact that it actually provided the Plaintiffs with continued use of a portion of the
Defendants' parcel that was enclosed by the fence. Id. at ^[10. By the time the
Defendants had purchased their property in 1998, however, the fence had deteriorated.
Id. at p . In 2001, the Plaintiffs brought an action seeking to quiet title to the portion of
the Defendant's parcel that was previously used by the Plaintiffs and enclosed by the
fence. Id. at %A. The Plaintiffs claimed that the presence of the fence from 1925 to 1965
was sufficient to have created a boundary by acquiescence. Id. The Court ruled in favor
of the Plaintiffs, reasoning that boundary by acquiescence had previously been
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Property up to the Fence line for a period of time in excess of twenty (20) consecutive
years, and did so without objection from their adjacent landowners. (T. 17, 18, 19, 34,
101, 302, 304, 305.) These facts, combined with Jorgensen's failure to offer evidence
that his predecessors in any way objected to the Fence line and/or the conduct of the
Brown family, are sufficient to establish mutual acquiescence along with the Brown
family's undisputed ownership of the Subject Property long before Jorgensen acquired the
Jorgensen Parcel. Under these circumstances, Jorgensen's untimely discovery that the
Fence was not the record property line in 1994 is of no consequence and cannot alter the
boundary by acquiescence that had been established years before Jorgensen purchased the
Jorgensen Parcel in 1979. See RHNCorp., 2004 UT at | 3 1 , 96 P.3d at 943; see also Dahl
Inv. Co., 2004 UT App at fl 1, 101 P.3d at 832.
In light of the foregoing, the Browns and Jorgensen, as well as their respective
predecessors in interest, have mutually acquiesced in the Fence as the boundary line
between the Brown Parcel and the Jorgensen Parcel. Therefore, the Trial Court erred to
the extent that it did not rule in favor of the Browns on this issue.

III.

THE FENCE SEPARATING THE BROWN AND JORGENSEN PARCELS
SATISFIES THE FIRST ELEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY
BY ACQUIESCENCE BECAUSE IT CONSTITUTES A VISIBLE
MONUMENT ERECTED AND MAINTAINED AS A BOUNDARY.

The Trial Court was somewhat ambivalent on this issue. In one portion of the
Trial Court's Memorandum Decision, the Court stated that the Browns had satisfied this
element of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. (See RI 0488, 0490.) However,
other portions of the Memorandum Decision imply that the Browns had not satisfied this
-34-

element because they allegedly erected and maintained the Fence only to contain
livestock and protect a ditch, but did not think of the Fence as a boundary line between
the properties. (See RI 0488, 0491) (Contra RI 0485.) Therefore, to the extent that the
Trial Court found that the Browns did not erect, maintain, and continually view the Fence
as a "boundary" between the properties, the Browns appeal.
The Hum us: and their predecessors in interest, have satisfied the first requirement
of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence because they have occupied the Subject
Property up to a visible line marked - .,
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several years. Orton, 970 P.2d at 1255. By mutual consent of the adjoining landowners,
the front portion of the fence was removed and replaced with a common lane. Id. The
owners occupied their respective properties up to the common lane and both used the
common lane. Id. at 1257. In a subsequent boundary by acquiescence dispute, the court
held that the fence and common lane satisfied the first element of the doctrine despite the
fact that a portion of the fence was no longer present. Id. The court further found that the
owners of the two lots viewed the fence line as the boundary between the parcels. Id.
Like the Orton case, Brown and Jorgensen have each occupied their respective
properties up to the Fence, as have their predecessors in interest. (RI 0488.) The Fence
has remained in the same basic position since the time of its creation (T. 59-60, 65, 69,
74), and has been a clearly observable boundary marker between the Brown Parcel and
the Jorgensen Parcel. (T. 53, 69.) Jorgensen even admitted to seeing the Fence posts
when he originally purchased the Jorgensen Parcel in 1979. (T. 23) (RI 0486.) The fact
that small portions of the Fence might have fallen into disrepair over the course of the
Fence's existence is insufficient to defeat Brown's claim. See Orton, 970 P.2d at 1257.
Under the circumstances, the Fence at issue has been clearly open to observation, and
constitutes a definite object separating the Brown Parcel from the Jorgensen Parcel.
Not only did the Fence constitute a visible line marking the boundary between the
adjoining parcels, but the Browns and their predecessors have occupied and used the
Subject Property up to the Fence continuously since the 1940fs. (R. 0488.) Throughout
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the IVmv u\ h^ iiul maintained "the Fence as though it were, the boundary between (In,
two parcels. (X 94.) The Browns did not original,) e:.
Fence for any purpose ot* iv, , i, J \ \ i

*

*

- maintain the
• •ie between the Brown Parcel

. lOh-1 OV.j Any subsequent benefit or use of the Fence,
MI1 h as containing livestock, is purely one of coincidence or convenience,, and w d> im * i
the original intent of the Browns or their predecessors.
For the reasons set iorlh 1ih»,«1 I iln, Binv\ ir and their predecessors in interest,
have satisfied lie •

IMNI

ivqiinrment of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence because

have occupied the Subject Property up to a visible line marked by a se*.,
at all times, treated as a boundary between 1k p ••( »•
Jorgensen clearly Knev

;

?

s,

"cumstances,

uu uie ieiKe line served as J boundai \

marker beiwoen •- properties - and that the Bi evvns and others in the area consuu?* *• lu-

Fence as such a boundary. As such, the Trial Court erred to the extent that it did not rule
in favor of the Browns on this element.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE BROWNS5
MOTION TO AMEND THE PLEADINGS BECAUSE THE
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT ISSUE WAS TRIED BY IMPLIED
CONSENT, THE MERITS OF THE ACTION WERE SUBSERVED, AND
JORGENSEN WOULD HAVE SUFFERED NO PREJUDICE AS A
RESULT.
The Trial Court should have allowed the Browns' pleadings to have been amended

to conform to the evidence pursuant to Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides two separate situations in which
a trial court can rule on issues not raised by the pleadings. Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman
Financial, 1999 UT 13, f8, 974 P.2d 288; see also UTAH R. Civ. P. 15(b). The first
situation is mandatory, and "requires the trial court to consider issues not raised in the
pleadings if the parties tried the issues by express or implied consent. Fibro, 1999 UT at
Tf8, 974 P.2d at 291; see also UTAH R. Civ. P. 15(b). "A party may try an issue by implied
consent by failing to object to the introduction of evidence related to the unpleaded
issue." Fibro, 1999 UT at f 8, 974 P.2d at 291; see also England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d
340, 345 (Utah App. 1997) (holding that if a party fails to object to a motion to amend the
pleadings, the trial court has full discretion to grant or deny the motion).
The second situation is permissive, and applies only when a party actually objects
to evidence at trial on the ground that it is outside the issues raised in the pleadings.
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Fibro, 1999 UT at %99 974 P.2d at 291. After this objection is made, the trial court may
allow a party to amend its pleadings if (1) "the presentation of the merits of the action
will be subserved thereby[;]" and (2) "the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the
admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense."
Id. at %9; citing UTAH R. VIC. P. 15(b); see also England, 944 P.2d at 345. Ultimately,
courts should be liberal in allowing pleadings to be amended so that cases may be fully
and fairly presented on their merits. Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403,
408 (Utah 1998).
In the instant case, the first situation, which mandates Rule 15(b) amendment,
applies because the issues relevant to determining whether the Browns had a prescriptive
easement were prosecuted at trial without any objection by Jorgensen. To establish a
prescriptive easement in Utah, a landowner must show a use that is (1) open; (2)
notorious; (3) adverse; and (4) continuous for at least twenty years. See Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 311 (Utah 1998); Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1258 (Utah
1998); Marchant v. Park City, 111 P.2d 677, 681 (Utah App. 1989), aff d, 788 P.2d 520
(Utah 1990). Similarly, to establish boundary by acquiescence in Utah, a person must
show (1) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings; (2)
mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary; (3) for a long period of time; and (4) by
adjoining landowners. RHNCorp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, ^[23, 96 P.3d 935, 941; Ault v.
Holden, 2002 UT 33, ^16, 44 P.3d 781, 788; Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah
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1998); Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah 1996). The requirement that mutual
acquiescence be for a long period of time has been interpreted in Utah to mean at least
twenty consecutive years. RHN Corp., 2004 UT at f30, 96 P.3d at 943; Ault, 2002 UT at
^23, 44 P.3d at 789; Orton, 970 P.2d at 1257. As such, both doctrines inherently require
the parties to argue the following issues: (1) whether and how the Parties used and/or
occupied the parcel of land in dispute; (2) whether said use and/or occupation was
adverse or agreed upon; and (3) whether said use lasted for a period of at least twenty
consecutive years. Therefore, each of the issues necessary to establish a prescriptive
easement was presented and established at trial in the instant boundary by acquiescence
case, and Jorgensen did not object to the introduction of that evidence at any time
throughout the proceedings. Because Jorgensen failed to object in this regard, he has
impliedly consented to the amendment of the Browns' pleadings to include the issue of
whether the Browns had acquired a prescriptive easement in the Subject Property. See
Fibro, 1999 UT at f 8, 974 P.2d at 291. As it stands, Rule 15(b) mandates that the Trial
Court consider the Browns' prescriptive easement claim as if the same had been
originally raised in the pleadings.
The Browns also submit that, independent of the foregoing arguments, it is in the
interest of justice and judicial economy to allow the pleadings to be amended and the
prescriptive easement claim to be adjudicated. Even if Jorgensen had objected to the
prescriptive easement evidence at trial (which he did not), the alternative requirements of
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Rule 15(b) have been satisfied.
First, presentation of the merits of the action would best be served by amending the
pleadings to include the Browns' prescriptive easement claim. Allowing the Browns'
pleadings to be amended would eliminate any duplication of the parties' resources
because each of the requisite elements of a prescriptive easement was inherently
addressed and tried concurrently with the elements of boundary by acquiescence, and
would, therefore, not need to be repeated at a subsequent time, and at further expense to
the parties. Second, Jorgensen's efforts to maintain his defense on the merits would not
suffer prejudice in any way. Jorgensen knew of the Browns' claims to the Subject
Property, and had already defended against said claims during the trial on the issue of
boundary by acquiescence. Because the prescriptive easement issue was apparent during
the trial on the elements of boundary by acquiescence, Jorgensen could not have suffered
any form of prejudice or surprise had the Trial Court allowed the Browns' pleadings to be
amended to include the prescriptive easement issue.
Accordingly, the Browns have satisfied all of the necessary requirements under
Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to amend their pleadings to conform to
the evidence. The Browns' claim of prescriptive easement should have been formally
adjudicated at the time of trial on the elements of the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence. The Trial Court erred by not allowing the Browns to do so.
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V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING JORGENSEN A
JUDGMENT FOR COSTS BECAUSE JORGENSEN FAILED TO FILE A
TIMELY MEMORANDUM OF COSTS PURSUANT TO RULE 54 OF THE
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
The Judgment for Costs awarded to Jorgensen at the conclusion of trial is invalid

because Jorgensen failed to file a timely Memorandum of Costs pursuant to the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. In Utah, a party who claims his costs must within five days
after the entry of judgment file with the trial court a duly verified memorandum of costs,
UTAH R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2); Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, 5 P.3d 616; Grindstaff v. Sheville,
2003 UT App 141, 71 P.3d 179; Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998), and
must also serve a copy of said verified memorandum on the adverse party within the same
time. UTAH R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2); Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 318. "[F]ailure to satisfy the
requirement for filing a verified memorandum of costs is fatal to a claim to recover costs
under Rule 54." Lyon, 2000 UT at % 77, 5 P.3d at 637; Grindstaff, 2003 UT App at f2, 71
P.3d at 179. This mandatory language leaves no discretion to the trial court with regard
to granting an award of costs. Lyon, 2000 UT at f 76, 5 P.3d at 637. The Lyon case
illustrates this straight-forward principle.
At the conclusion of the trial in Lyon, the trial court issued its judgment in favor of
the Lyons on July 11, 1995. Lyon, 2000 UT at f 77, 5 P.3d at 637. The Lyons, however,
did not file a verified memorandum of costs with the trial court until July 26, 1995 fifteen (15) days after the entry of the trial court's judgment. Id. at f77. The court held
that the Lyon's failure to file the verified memorandum of costs within five days of the
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judgment pursuant to Rule 54(d)(2) prevented the award of costs in the matter. Id. at f7778. On appeal, the decision of the trial court not to award costs to the Lyons was
affirmed. Id.
The instant case is analogous to the situation in Lyons. In the case at hand, the
Trial Court entered judgment against the Browns on August 2, 2004. (RI 0573.) As part
of that judgment, the Trial Court awarded Jorgensen his costs "as may hereafter be
established by a memorandum of costs and disbursements filed pursuant to Rule 54(d),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (Id.) After receiving judgment in his favor, however,
Jorgensen failed to file the requisite memorandum of costs within the five (5) day period
mandated by Rule 54(d), and has still failed to file said memorandum of costs to the
present date. Jorgensen even admitted that he failed to file pursuant to Rule 54(d), and
that such failure to file was an error. (Appellee's Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. Disp. at 8.)
As such, Jorgensen is in clear violation of Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, as well as that Rule's supporting case law. The award of costs granted to
Jorgensen by the Trial Court should, therefore, be deemed invalid.
VI.

THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS INVALID INSOFAR AS IT
PURPORTS TO ADJUDICATE ALL CLAIMS OF THE BROWNS AS
WELL AS ALL CLAIMS OF ALL OTHER PERSONS WHO MAY CLAIM
BY, THROUGH, OR UNDER THE BROWNS.
The Trial Court's judgment is invalid to the extent that it is overly broad in scope,

and precludes future claims in a manner that is incompatible with the doctrine of res
judicata. Simply put, the doctrine of res judicata describes the binding effect of a
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previous adjudication on a current adjudication. Culbertson v. Board of County
Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 2001 UT 91, 44 P.3d 642 (Utah 2001). The doctrine
of res judicata, often referred to as claim preclusion, "bars a party from prosecuting in a
subsequent action a claim that has been fully litigated previously." Culbertson, 2001 UT
at Tfl3. "For claim preclusion to bar a claim in a subsequent action, (1) the subsequent
action must involve the same parties, their privies, or their assigns as the first action, (2)
the claim to be barred must have been brought or have been available in the first action,
and (3) the first action must have produced a final judgment on the merits of the claim."
Id. Although claim preclusion restricts a party to a single adjudication with respect to
another party, it does not operate to bar a claim against a different party, even if the
subsequent action is related to the previously adjudicated claim. Serr v. Rick Jensen
Construction, Inc., 743 P.2d 1202, 1203 (Utah 1987). "A judgment becomes res judicata
only when the court has acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties."
SMP, Inc., v. Kirkman, 843 P.2d 531 (Utah App. 1992) (citing McCarthy v. State, 265
P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1953)). The Serr case elaborates on this concept.
In Serr, the Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against three defendants. Serr,
743 P.2d at 1203. One of the three defendants then filed a third-party claim against the
respondent. Id. At some point thereafter, the Plaintiff and the original three defendants
settled the case prior to trial. Id. The Plaintiff then sued the Respondent directly, and the
trial court granted the Respondent's motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis
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that the settlement of the initial action barred the subsequent action. Id. On appeal, the
appeals court reversed the ruling of the trial court, and reasoned that because the
subsequent suit between the Plaintiff and the Respondent involved different parties, the
doctrine of res judicata did not apply, and the new litigation could move forward despite
the fact that the claims were related. Id. at 1204.
The judgment of the Trial Court in the instant case purports to adjudicate all future
claims of the Browns, as well as all future claims of all other persons who may claim by,
through, or under the Browns. (R. at 0571.) Such a ruling is improper, overly broad, and
runs contrary to the established purpose of the doctrine of claim preclusion. The purpose
behind the doctrine of claim preclusion "is to prevent one party from suing the same party
in successive suits for claims that were or should have been brought in a single action."
Id. at 1203. The judgment at issue, however, runs afoul of this purpose by barring all
future claims of the Browns, or those claiming through them, irrespective of whether
those future claims and/or parties are in any way related to the claims and/or parties
already adjudicated in the instant case.
Under the circumstances, there is no way of knowing whether the Browns, or
others, will ever be involved in a subsequent action involving the Brown Parcel.
Regardless of this possibility, however, the Browns, and those claiming by, through, or
under them, cannot be barred from asserting their rights against other parties, including
Jorgensen, even if those rights are related to the boundary by acquiescence dispute
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currently between the parties, unless the specific requirements for claim preclusion have
been met. Claim preclusion will only apply if the future claims purportedly barred by the
Trial Court involve a subsequent ownership dispute over the same parcel of property at
issue in this case. See Culbertson, 2001 UT at f 13. Beyond that, however, the Trial
Court cannot lawfully prevent the Browns, or other parties, from asserting and defending
rights to the Brown Parcel which might arise independent of the current cause of action.
Moreover, the Trial Court in this case has only acquired subject matter jurisdiction
over the boundary by acquiescence dispute between the Browns and Jorgensen. It has
not, however, acquired subject matter jurisdiction over any of the future claims which the
judgment purports to bar. This lack of subject matter jurisdiction further invalidates the
Trial Court's ruling. See SMP, Inc., 843 P.2d at 533 (stating that res judicata will not
apply to the prior adjudication of a claim unless the prior adjudicating tribunal had subject
matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim on its merits). The Trial Court in this case has
only adjudicated the Browns' boundary by acquiescence claim against Jorgensen. It has
no authority to bar all future claims of the Browns, or those claiming by, through, or
under them, unless those future claims involve an action to quiet title in the same parcel
of real property at issue here, between the same parties to this action, their privies, or their
assigns.
As it stands, the final judgment in this case goes far beyond the scope of the Trial
Court's authority. The Court purports to bar potential claims over which it has not
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acquired subject matter jurisdiction, and which are entirely independent of those claims
adjudicated in the current litigation between the Browns and Jorgensen. For these
reasons, the Judgment of the Trial Court should be held invalid to the extent that it is
inconsistent with the doctrine of claim preclusion.

CONCLUSION
The Browns respectfully request that the decision of the Trial Court be reversed
and that title to the Subject Property be quieted in their favor.
DATED this 2 ^ d a y of August, 2005.
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.

imes C. Jenkins
Attorney for Appellants
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS E. BROWN, JR. and

RULING AND ORDER

MARILYN R. BROWN,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
LEE JORGENSEN, et al,
Defendants.

Civil No. 010600152
Judge Robert K. Hilder

Three motions are before the court for decision: plaintiffs5 Motion for Summary
Judgment; defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; and plaintiffs' Motion to Strike
the Affidavit of Lee Jorgensen. Neither side has requested oral argument, and plaintiffs' counsel
has specifically advised the court clerk that he requests the court to rule based on the pleadings.
The court has carefully considered the entire file, along with the applicable law, and being fully
advised, rules as follows:
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Lee Jorgensen is DENIED for the reasons
stated in the opposing memorandum.
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was filed first, and disposition of that Motion
essentially addresses the remaining two motions before the court. In considering plaintiffs'
Motion, the court may not weigh the evidence, and all inferences and doubts must be construed
in favor of the non-moving party. The court does not entirely agree that a quiet title action based
on the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence could only be decided (that is, in favor of the party
seeking additional property not otherwise conveyed) by motion in the rarest of cases, but the
trend as set forth in Utah appellate decisions is in that direction. Former Chief Justice Howe
certainly suggested that boundary by acquiescence generally should be reserved for minor
boundary adjustments, Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). More to the point,
regarding motion practice, the very recent case of Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33 (Utah March 26,
2002), held that "mere conversations between the parties evidencing either an ongoing dispute as
to the property line or an unwillingness by one of the adjoining landowners to accept the line as
the boundary refute any allegation that the parties may have mutually acquiesced in the line as
the property demarcation." Id. at para. 21.

In fact, once the Ault court identified conversations suggesting dispute, it deemed those
conversations dispositive. The court not only reversed summary judgment for the parties
claiming boundary by acquiescence, but instructed the trial court to quiet title in favor of the
deed holders.
Turning to this case, the court finds the Ault decision and its predecessors controlling.
There is no uncertainty regarding the elements of boundary by acquiescence. Both parties state
them correctly: (i) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings,
(ii) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (iii) for a long period of time, (iv) by
adjoining landowner's. Ault, at para. 16, and cases cited therein).
The undisputed facts in this case establish some, but not all, of the elements.
Specifically, there can be no question about elements (iii) and (iv). The decisions are completely
consistent that "a long period of time" means at least twenty years, but once twenty years is
established, that should suffice. In this case plaintiffs have a couple of strong arguments. First,
they claim a total time of 53 years, including 33 years of no objection from defendants
predecessors, and just over 20 years without objection from defendant himself. The court finds
that under almost any analysis, plaintiffs prevail on this point. The thirty three years without
objection from defendant's predecessors satisfies the requirement. Defendant argues that the
only evidence of absence of dispute is plaintiff Tom Brown's testimony, some of which dates
back to when Mr. Brown was a boy, but the point is that there is, in fact, no other evidence, and
nothing suggests that Mr. Brown's evidence is not competent. At the summary judgment stage,
absent a valid Rule 56(f) affidavit, the non-moving party is held to the state of the evidence at the
time of submission, and conjecture is not evidence. Accordingly, the claim of no dispute for 33
years is unrefuted.
The court was not cited to any law that says a successor is not bound by the acquiescence
of his predecessor, but if he contests the binding nature of the actions of his predecessor, it hardly
advances his cause to sit on his rights for twenty years without taking action.
The court also finds that, independently of the action of Mr. Jorgensen's predecessors,
there is no evidence before the court thaUie,actually disputed the boundary until just after the
twenty year period passed. For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the long period of time
element is satisfied.
The is also no question as to element (iv), regarding adjoining landowners. Plaintiffs
have clearly sketched the chain of title to all relevant parcels, and defendant's testimony is in
accord.
Plaintiffs' Motion fails, however, with respect to the first two elements. This is not
because there is no substantial evidence to support plaintiffs' claims, but because defendant has
also advanced competent and credible evidence to the contrary, particularly as to (ii), the
requirement of a visible line marked by, in this case, a fence. This is a critically material point in
this case, and given the strict appellate scrutiny suggested by Ault, this court cannot find, in the
face of defendant's evidence and argument, that the fence in question met the necessary standard

for any of the long periods of time identified herein.
Finally, defendant's evidence as to occupation is the much weaker of the two sides at this
point, but the court cannot say that the question is undisputed.
Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, but
GRANTS partial summary judgment, as follows: as a matter of law, and based on the undisputed
evidence before the court, plaintiff satisfies elements (iii) and (iv) of the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence, as follows: If the factfinder determines that elements (I) and (ii) are met, plaintiffs
will not be required to prove the remaining elements at trial.
For the same reasons, defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.
This signed Ruling shall be the ORDER of the court and no further Order is required.
DATED this 6th day of April, 2002.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS E. BROWN, Jr. and MARILYN R.
BROWN,
Plaintiffs,

LEE JORGENSEN'S MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT
OF LEE JORGENSEN

vs.
LEE JORGENSEN; John Does 1-10; and other
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Defendants.
Defendant Lee Jorgensen, "Jorgensen", by and through his counsel of record, hereby submits
the following Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' "Brown", Febmary 19, 2002 Motion to
Strike Affidavit of Lee Jorgensen.

The January 16, 2002 Affidavit of Lee Jorgensen, "Jorgensen Affidavit", was filed in
Opposition to Browns' December 20, 2001 Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of
Jorgensen's January 18, 2002 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Browns' January 19, 2002 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Affidavit of Lee
Jorgensen, "Browns' Memorandum", asserts generally that the Jorgensen Affidavit does not meet the
requirements of Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure but does not refer to or point out what
specific statement or statements in the Jorgensen Affidavit Brown finds objectionable.
Browns' Memorandum cites Rule 602, U.R.E., requiring a witness to have "personal
knowledge of the matter". That Rule also states that evidence of personal knowledge may consist of
"the witness' own testimony".
Paragraph 1 of the Jorgensen Affidavit satisfies that Rule. It specifically states Jorgensen
"has personal knowledge of the matters hereinafter set forth".
Browns' Memorandum asserts generally that the Jorgensen Affidavit states conclusions not
supported by facts, contains hearsay contrary to U.R.E. 801 and irrelevant matter contrary to U.R.E.
401 and contains "supposition and speculation".
The Jorgensen Affidavit has none of those defects and meets the requirements of Rule 56(e)
U.R.C.P.
Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Jorgensen Affidavit state Jorgensen's ownership of Jorgensen's
two separately described contiguous parcels of property adjoining Plaintiffs property—essentially
affimiing Plaintiffs' allegations as to Jorgensen's record title. "There is no dispute that Jorgensen is
the record title owner of the Subject Property." (See page 2 of Browns' February 19, 2002
2

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment.)1
Jorgensen's understanding^elief/state of mind with respect to his property line is obviously
relevant.
Regarding the old fence line, the Jorgensen Affidavit states facts observed by Jorgensen
personally and facts concerning his personal understanding of the location of his Northeastern
property line and its relationship to the old fence, irrigation ditch and "Ditch Road".
Jorgensen Affidavit paragraph 5 states Jorgensen's obviously relevant, personal observation
in 1978 of survey stakes along the downhill (Northeasterly) property line below the old irrigation
ditch and Ditch Road.
Paragraph 5 also states the information provided to Jorgensen at that time as to the property
line being marked by the stakes—downhill from the Ditch Road which provided access to the
property and was a significant reason why he purchased it. Jorgensen's understanding/belief/state of
mind as to the location of the property line (not along the old fence) with respect to which he is
competent to testify, is obviously relevant and not an inadmissible "conclusion" not supported by the
facts. The factual basis for Jorgensen's understanding of the location of the property line is properly

The paities respective recorded deeds and a numbei of earlier recoided instruments in their chains of title have been
made Exhibits 6-24 to Joigensen's January 18, 2002 Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Recorded deeds and recoided decrees of
distiibution are "public lecords" admissible under Rule 1005, U.R E. Brown does not appeal to challenge what is shown
by the parties lespective recorded chains of title, suivey's and othei documents but simply aigue such aie all melevant
having been "humped" by the existence of the old fence upon which Plaintiffs lely to gain title to 6 94 acies of Joigensen
property by means of Browns' (enoneous) interpietation of the legal dochine of boundaiy by acquiescence (See p 4 of
Plaintiffs' February 19, 2002 Memoiandum of Points and Authorities m Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment.)

3

stated in his Affidavit. If Jorgensen's understanding of the location of his boundary (the same as his
legal description) is a "conclusion" or "supposition or speculation" then Brown's assertion that he
and his family always believed the fence was the boundary (See paragraph 6 of December 20, 2001
Affidavit of Thomas E. Brown, "Brown Affidavit") is likewise an "conclusion" or "supposition or
speculation" as are Brown's uncross-examined statements that he or his family "continuously
occupied" up to the fence. (See paragraph 6 of the Brown Affidavit)2
Paragraph 8 of the Jorgensen Affidavit states Jorgensen's observations that fence "remnants"
were on the property at the time Jorgensen acquired the property, including his observation that the
fences did not show evidence of having been maintained for many decades and the information
received from agents of the realty company that the old fence remnants were within the subject
property—information coinciding with the survey stakes and legal description.
Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Jorgensen Affidavit states that Jorgensen visited the property from
time to time since 1978 until into 1994 and that in the course of those visits, Jorgensen observed no
livestock Northeast of the fence remnants. Those are obviously relevant observations creating an
issue of fact as to Brown's claim that he and his family "continuously occupied" the 6.94 acres.
Paragraph 11 of the Jorgensen Affidavit states he did not personally operate livestock on his
property but gave oral permission for others to do so.

2

Biown's Affidavit also asserts the Brown family laised crops, cattle and lawn grass "on the Subject Property" (Biown
Affidavit, paiagiaph 6 and 8) Tliese "facts" as to "crops" and "lawn glass" aie counteied by the stark physical fact that
most of the 6 94 acres beyond the fence is a fairly steep sagebrush covered hillside as shown by the Brown/Joigensen
photographs made Exhibits to the Jorgensen Memoiandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
and in Support of Joigensen's Motion for Partial Summaiy Judgment—Exhibits 4 1, 4 4, 4 5, 5 2 2, 5 3.2 and 5 5 2

4

Paragraph 12 of the Jorgensen Affidavit contains Jorgensen's understanding that the fence
remnants were meaningless.
Paragraphs 13 through 15 of the Jorgensen Affidavit state that in 1994, discussions or
conversations took place about sale/development which were apparently the impetus for Brown's
efforts to rebuild the fence—efforts that Jorgensen personally observed in May or June of 1994, as set
forth in paragraph 16 of the Jorgensen Affidavit. Jorgensen's observations in that regard are
obviously relevant and, in fact, consistent with paragraph 10 of the Brown Affidavit, that Brown
"improved the fence" June 1994-1996.
Paragraph 17 of the Jorgensen Affidavit states that he visited his property again in the spring
of 1999 and observed a wooden fence constructed by Brown obstructing the entrance to the Ditch
Road and the new wire fence where the dilapidated abandoned fence had originally been placed.
Those obviously relevant observations provided Jorgensen the impetus to send Brown the
handwritten letter of protest dated July 30, 1999 which Brown has made Exhibit "F" to Plaintiffs
December 20, 2001 Memorandum.
Paragraphs 19 and 20 of the Jorgensen Affidavit state that Brown refused to remove any
fences in response to the Jorgensen July 30, 1999 letter, state Jorgensen's observations concerning
the wood fence constructed by Brown when Jorgensen revisited the property, state Jorgensen's
observations about a buried drain pipe and concerning what appeared to Jorgensen to be efforts on
the part of Brown to obstruct the old Ditch Road on Jorgensen's property and describes where the
fence was reconstructed in relation to the photographs taken by Jorgensen and also by Brown—all
relevant matters concerning which Jorgensen is competent to testify.
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Paragraph 21 of the Jorgensen Affidavit states the parties had a discussion after Jorgensen
sent his July 30, 1999 letter to Brown and paragraph 22 states that Jorgensen did not agree with
Brown that the old fence remnants were intended to be or should be regarded as establishing the
property line.
Paragraph 23 states Jorgensen's understanding that the old fence remnants did not mark a
property line, (and were inconsistent with legal descriptions and Brown's own survey).
Paragraph 24 states Jorgensen has never been uncertain as to his Northeastern property line.
Paragraph 25 states Jorgensen's opinion that the original purpose of the old fence remnants
was to provide livestock control—an opinion consistent with the net wire/barb wire nature of the old
fence remnants.
Paragraph 28 states Jorgensen's opinion as to the recent increased value of his 6.94 acres
sought to be acquired by Brown and Jorgensen's need for access to the balance of his property
provided by the old Ditch Road running through that 6.94 acres—again both relevant matters as to
which he is competent to testify.
Paragraph 29 of the Jorgensen Affidavit states that Jorgensen has paid all real property taxes
assessed against the Subject Property since the time he acquired it—a matter also shown by public
records.
The basic relevant fact competently provided by the Jorgensen Affidavit is simply that
Jorgensen was never in doubt as to the location of his Northeastern property line and so protested
Browns' reconstruction of the old fence and effort to claim 6.94 acres of Jorgensen's property by
reason of the old reconstructed fence.

CONCLUSION
The Jorgensen Affidavit satisfies the requirements of Rule 56(e) U.R.C.P.
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Lee Jorgensen should be denied.
DATED this 6th day of March, 2002.

Ray G JVIartineau
Tony Martineau
David S. Cook
Attorneys for Lee Jorgensen

Served the foregoing by faxing and rMlTing^a^opy thereof to James C. Jenkins and Robert B.
Funk, Olsen & Hoggan, Attorneys for Plafmtiffs, 1-435^2-2295, 88 WesrCenter Street, P.O. Box
525, Logan, Utah 84323-0525 this 6th day if March, 2002.
^
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RayG Martineau#2105
Anthony R Martineau #5859
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone (801) 486-0200
Fax (801)486-0383
David S Cook #0715
85 West 400 North
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone (801)292-7216
Fax (801)292-7271
Attorneys for Defendant Lee Jorgensen

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS E BROWN, Jr and MARILYN R
BROWN,
AFFIDAVIT OF LEE JORGENSEN
Plaintiffs,
vs
LEE JORGENSEN, John Does 1-10, and other
persons unknown claiming title or interest in th<
subject property of this action,

Civil No 010600152
Judge Robeit K Hildei

Defendants

STATE OF UTAH

)
ss

COUNTY OF SAL I LAKE )
Lee Jorgensen, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says

1. Affiant is the Defendant in this proceeding, a citizen and resident of the State of Utah,
over the age of 21 years, has personal knowledge of the matters hereinafter set forth and makes this
affidavit in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and in support of Defendant's
(Affiant's) Motion For Partial Summary Judgment.
2. Affiant owns and holds fee simple record title to certain rural real property ("Property")
adjoining plaintiffs' property located in Section 15, Township 1 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, Summit County, State of Utah.
3. Affiant's adjoining Property consists of two contiguous but separately described parcels,
the legal descriptions of which are set forth in Paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and also appear m
certain title reports and mesne conveyances, copies of which have been attached as Exhibits to the
memorandum ("Defendant's Memorandum") filed in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Support of Defendant's (Affiant's) Opposing Motion for Paitia) Summary
Judgment.
4. A copy of the April 1, 1979 Special Warranty Deed conveying said property to Affiant
and Dean W. Rowell ("Rowell"), and a copy of the February 13, 1986 Quit Claim Deed executed by
Rowell conveying his interest therein to Affiant is attached as Exhibit "E" to Plaintiffs'
Memorandum of Points and Authorities m Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
(''Plaintiffs' Memorandum").
5. Prior to the time Affiant and Rowell acquired the Property, Affiant visited the Pioperty in
1978 and observed several survey stakes along the Property's downhill (Northeastern) boundary line
which in turn were downhill and Northeast from an old irrigation ditch and a roadway ("Ditch Road")
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that ran parallel to thereto and Affiant was then informed by a person representing the seller Utah
Title and Abstract Company, that such survey stakes marked the Property's Northeast boundary line
and that both the old ditch and the Ditch Road, uphill from the survey stakes, were on the Property
Affiant determined to purchase the Property in significant part because of the Ditch Road, which ran
southeast from Brown's Canyon highway across the Property and up into the canyon (''South
Canyon") south of the Brown's Canyon highway, which made the Property accessible to vehicles
with high ground clearance
6

The irrigation ditch has apparently long been used to convey water across the Property
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Affiant was provided with one or two old surveys before Affiant purchased the Property

(present whereabouts of surveys is piesently unknown to Affiant) which showed that the
Northeastern boundary of the Propeity was Northeast of both the irrigation ditch and adjoining Ditch
Road
8

At the time Affiant acquited the Property, there were remnants of two or three fences

running generally North and South, and two or three fence remnants running generally from the
Northwest to the Southeast along the hillside West and Southwest of the Northeast boundary of the
Property, none of which fences showed any evidence of having been maintained for many decades
Affiant was assured by agents of Stewart Grow Realty that these old fence remnants were all within
the Property Affiant and Rowell weie purchasing
9

From time to time, from 1978 until well into 1994, Affiant traveled the Ditch Road

thiough the Property to the canyon in various vehicles and on foot
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10 In none of Affiant's visits to the Property did Affiant observe that Browns had livestock in
the area of the Property lying Northeast of the old dilapidated fence remnants
11 Affiant has never operated livestock on the Property nor leased it for grazing However,
Affiant gave permission through Ed Rogers to persons unknown to the Affiant for use of the Property
for grazing livestock
12 At the time and after Affiant purchased the Property, so far as Affiant was concerned, the
fence remnants appeared to be meaningless
13 In 1994, Affiant had discussions with others who were interested in acquiring/developing
Affiant's property, particularly the portion thereof adjoining the Brown's Canyon highway and with
representatives of Garff/Rogers who were interested in acquiring the right to use (and improve) the
old Ditch Road foi access to Garff/Rogers' propeity located at or near the southern and of the Ditch
Road
14 Affiant understands that at that time, Craig McPhie and others then had discussions with
Thomas E Brown ("Brown") concerning apparent survey results with which Brown disagieed and
Affiant was advised efforts might be taken by Brown to build a fence cutting off access up the old
Ditch Road
15 In 1994, a developer named Warburton who proposed to assist Affiant in the
development of the Property, prepared a document showing how the portion of Affiant's Property
fronting the Brown's Canyon highway and West of Browns' property could be developed with a load
providing access to the Brown's Canyon highway by means of the old Ditch Road
drawing is annexed to the Defendant's Memorandum
4

A copy of said

16 In late May or early June of 1994, Affiant and others went to the Property and observed
that post holes were being dug by Brown and it was apparent that completion of a fence along the line
of the post holes would completely block access into and across Affiant's Property up the old Ditch
Road to the canyon Affiant is informed that dunng the next several months of 1994, Brown erected a
(wood) fence along the Brown's Canyon highway
17 Affiant next visited Affiant's Property in the spring of 1999 when Affiant learned that
Ray McCarty had developed a subdivision called Elk Ridge North across the Brown's Canyon
highway from Affiant's Property Affiant and Bill Gardner, a realtor, then visited Affiant's Property
and observed that Browns had constructed not only a wooden fence obstructing the entrance to the
Ditch Road but also a new wire fence where the dilapidated abandoned fence had originally been
placed
18 Affiant immediately sent Brown a registered letter dated July 30, 1999 demanding that he
remove his fences from Affiant's Property A copy of said letter has been attached as Exhibit "F" to
Plaintiffs' Memorandum
19 Plaintiffs' refused to remove any fences, although Brown did call Affiant upon receipt of
the letter and advised Affiant that there had been a misunderstanding and that Brown had hued
suiveyor Kent Wilde to make a survey of Brown's property Affiant thereafter revisited the Piopeity
to see what had taken place and observed that Blown had extended a wood fence East to his driveway
and had apparently also buried a drain pipe in the old irrigation ditch It also appeared to Affiant that
Brown had been endeavoring to obliterate all traces of the old Ditch Road
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20. The new fence constructed by Browns in about 1995 across Affiant's property, traverses
a hillside with sagebrush on both sides as shown by photographs taken by Affiant and also by Brown
which have been made Exhibits to Defendant's Memorandum.
21. The only discussion Affiant has ever had with Brown having to do with the fence was a
conversation in which Brown requested a Quit Claim Deed conveying 6.94 acres of Affiant's
Property lying Northeast of the new fence and offering in exchange a right-of-way narrow in width
and in the scope of use up the old Ditch Road across the 6.94 acres. That discussion took placed after
Affiant sent his July 30, 1999 letter to Brown.
22. Affiant has not agreed at any time with Brown that the old fence remnants or any portion
thereof, or the new fences constructed by Browns or any portion thereof, were ever intended to be or
should be regarded as establishing or evidencing any boundary lines.
23. Affiant has never had any belief or understanding that the old fence remnants which
existed when Affiant acquired the Property were intended to mark or establish any boundary line and
Affiant has always intended to own all of the Property within the legal descriptions contained in
Affiant's deeds. The legal descriptions of Affiant's land adjoin Browns' legal descriptions without
any gaps or overlaps as shown by the legal descriptions themselves and by the ownership plat map
maintained by Summit County, a copy of which has been attached as an Exhibit to Defendant's
Memorandum.
24. Affiant has never been uncertain as to his actual Northeast boundary line of the Property,
Affiant having been shown the same as outlined by several stakes in 1978 prior to Affiant purchasing
the Property.
6

25. Affiant has no personal knowledge as to why fences evidenced by the old fence remnants
were originally installed but the fact the old fence remnants included net wire strongly suggests the
old fences were intended for sheep control—perhaps to keep sheep grazing in the area from coming
down onto the irrigation ditch and Ditch Road, and/or to contain ewes and lambs during the lambing
season. Affiant has been advised by Meryl Allen, a daughter of Tracy Wright, that the downhill flat
portion of Affiant's property across the old Ditch Road had been used by Tracy Wright over the years
as a lambing area.
26. Since Affiant acquired his Property, the only use made thereof by Brown to Affiant's
knowledge is trespassing to install the new fences.
27. Browns have not offered to pay defendant any consideration for the 6.94 acres of
Affiant's Property which Browns' own survey indicates lies to the Northeast of the old fence
remnants and the new fence installed by Brown.
28. The Ditch Road's access from the Brown Canyon highway through the Property together
with the relatively flat portion of Affiant's Property lying along the Ditch Road, is the most valuable
part of Affiant's Property and offers access to the remaining portion of the Property and the greatest
possibility of residential and recreational development of the same and all of said portion lies within
the 6.94 acres of Affiant's Property which Plaintiffs seek to take solely by reason of the old fence
remnants.
29. All real property taxes related to the Property since Affiant acquired the same have been
paid by Affiant.
Dated this 16th day of January, 2002.
7

/

Lee JorgeiWen
Subscnbed and sworn to before me this 16th day of January, 2002
Notary Public H I
TAMARAFROISLAND .
3098 Highland Dnve Suite 450
Satt Lake City, Utah 64106
My Commission Expires
March 15 2005

* w^t£j3fJLJtah

I
.
I

Notary Public

|

Served the foregoing by mailing a copy thereof the James C Jenkins and Robert B Funk,
Olsen & Hoggan, Attorneys for Plaintiffs, 88 West Centei Street, P O Box 525, Logan, Utah 843230525 this _ | $ __ day of January, 2002

JA^M^k
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Ray G. Martineau #2105
Anthony R. Martineau #5859
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 486-0200
Fax: (801)486-0383
DavidS. Cook #0715
85 West 400 North
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 292-7216
Fax:(801)292-7217
Attorneys for Defendant Lee Jorgensen

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS E. BROWN, Jr. and MARILYN R.
BROWN,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

JUDGMENT QUIETING TITLE TO REAL
PROPERTY IN LEE JORGENSEN AND
DIRECTING REMOVAL OF FENCE/FENCE
IMPROVEMENTS

LEE JORGENSEN; John Does 1-10; and other
persons unknown claiming title or interest in the
subject property of this action,
Defendants.

Civil No. 010600152
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck

The above entitled matter was tried before the Court, Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck presiding, on
March 31 and April 1, 2004.
The Plaintiffs Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown appeared in person and were
represented by attorneys James C. Jenkins and Robert B. Funk.

Defendant Lee Jorgensen appeared in person and was represented by his attorneys Ray G.
Martineau and David S. Cook,
The Court heard and considered the evidence and the arguments of counsel, took the matter
under advisement and made and entered the Court's Memorandum Decision dated April 7, 2004, in
which the Court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set forth therein and ordered that
quiet title be awarded to Defendant as in the recorded instruments and directed Defendant to prepare an
order in compliance with URCP, Rule 7(f) setting forth the Court's ruling.
By Objection to Proposed Order Quieting Title to Real Property in Lee Jorgensen and Request
for Hearing dated April 14, 2004, Plaintiffs objected to the form of order quieting title in Lee Jorgensen
prepared by Defendant.
On or about June 10, 2004 Plaintiffs filed Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Motion to Amend Pleadings to
Conform to the Evidence; Motion to Amend Findings of the Court; and Motion to Alter or Amend the
Court's Memorandum Decision and Request for Hearing and a memorandum in support of the said
motions.
Defendant filed memorandums responding to Plaintiffs' April 10, 2004 objection and June 10,
2004 motions and those matters were heard by the Court on July 12, 2004.
By Ruling and Order dated July 15, 2004, the Court denied Plaintiffs June 10, 2004 motions for
the reasons set forth in that Ruling and Order; ruled the Court's April 7, 2004 Memorandum Decision
amended to include the property description as set forth in Defendant's proposed order, finding such to
be an accurate description of the properties involved, ruled that Plaintiff is to remove the fence installed
by Plaintiff along the roadway and the improvements made by Plaintiff to the fenceline which has been
in existence for many years and directed Defendant to prepare a new order with those modifications.
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NOW THEREFORE, the Court now makes and enters the following judgment pursuant to the
Court's April 7, 2004 Memorandum Decision and the Court's July 15, 2004 Ruling and Order:
1. Fee simple title to all of the following described real property should be and the same is
hereby quieted in Defendant Lee Jorgensen against and free and clear of all boundary by acquiescence
and all other claims of Plaintiffs Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown and of all claims of all
other persons who may claim by, through or under Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown or
either of them:
PARCEL A:
BEGINNING at a point that is due South 3896.809 feet and due East 19,394.098 feet from the
Northwest corner of Section 18, Township 1 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
Summit County, Utah (said Northwest corner bearing North 1°06'56" West from the Southwest
corner and being the basis of bearing for this description) thence North 35°30' West 1641.209
feet to a point on the Southerly right of way line of State Highway 196; thence North 43°42' East
along said right of way line 1101.410 feet to a point of tangency with a 1095.916 foot radius
curve; thence Northeasterly along the arc of said curve to the right through a central angle of
40°55'31", a distance of 837.778 feet to a point on the West line of the Southeast quarter of the
Northeast quarter of Section 15, Township 1 South Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base Meridian;
thence leaving said right of way line South 2°28'33" East along said West line to the Southeast
corner of the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 15; thence East along the
South line of the Southeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 15 to the Northeast
corner of the Southeast quarter of said Section 15; thence South 2°30'40" East along the East
line of said Southeast quarter 1297.974 feet; thence South 86° West 1922.645 feet to the point of
BEGINNING.
EXCEPTING THEREFROM the following described parcels:
Exception Parcel 1:
BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of the Southeast quarter of Section 15, Township 1 South,
Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; running thence West 211 feet; thence Southeasterly
703 feet, more or less, to a point on the Section line 671 feet South of the place of beginning;
thence North 671 feet to the place of BEGINNING.
Exception Parcel 2:
A tract situated in the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section 15, Township 1
South Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, described as follows:
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BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of said
Section 15; and running thence South 11.00 chains; thence North 47°20' West 16.5 chains;
thence East 12.42 chains to the place of BEGINNING.
PARCEL B:
BEGINNING 4.7 chains West of the East quarter Section corner of Section 15, Township 1
South Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence West 15.3 chains; thence North 9.5
chains; thence South 58°10' East 18.02 chains, more or less, to the place of BEGINNING.
Said real property, title to which is hereby quieted in Defendant Lee Jorgensen, includes the
following described 6.94-acre parcel of Lee Jorgensen's property which was claimed by Plaintiffs
Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown in this proceeding under the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence:
Beginning at a point which is West 211.00 feet from the East lA corner of Section 15,
Township 1 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence South
17°27'22" East 19.40 feet to a fence; thence South 64°52'21" West 25.75 feet along said
fence to a gate; thence South 59°33'56" West 15.81 feet to a fence corner; thence South
6°04'49" East 67.61 feet along a fence; thence South 3°31'35" East 28.89 feet along said
fence; thence North 38°57'12" West 58.36 feet along said fence; thence North 70°47'24"
West 53.17 feet along said fence; thence North 67°20'36" West 573.54 feet along said
fence; thence North 67°15'37" West 356.37 feet along said fence; thence North
67°04'47" West 279.80 feet along said fence; thence North 4 1 W 5 2 " West 581.67 feet
to the Southerly right-of-way line of Brown's Canyon Road; thence along the arc of a
curve to the right 167.18 feet (radius 1103.16 feet, long chord bearing North 60°25'19"
East 167.02 feet) along said right-of-way to the Tom Brown deed line; thence South
47°20'00" East 748.14 feet along said deed line, thence North 33.00 feet along said deed
line; thence South 58°10'00" East 1189.32 feet along said deed line; thence East 99.20
feet along said deed line to the point of beginning. Containing 6.94 acres.
2. Plaintiff Thomas E. Brown, Jr. is hereby ordered and directed to forthwith remove the
wood fence erected by Thomas E. Brown, Jr. along Brown's Canyon Road in a portion of the
above described Lee Jorgensen property.
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3. Thomas E. Brown, Jr. is hereby ordered and directed to forthwith remove the wire and
fence post improvements installed by Thomas E. Brown, Jr. along part of the fence along the
hillside in a portion of the Lee Jorgensen property.
4.

Defendant Lee Jorgensen should be and he is hereby awarded his costs of court

incurred herein as may hereafter be established by a memorandum of costs and disbursements
filed pursuant to Rule 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
MADE AND ENTERED this

day of

, 2004.

BY THE COURT:

Bruce C. Lubeck
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment Quieting Title To Real
Property In Lee Jorgensen And Directing Removal Of Fence/Fence Improvements was served upon the
following individuals by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to said individuals at the following
address this ^ - / day of July, 2004.
James C. Jenkins
Robert B. Funk
OLSON &HOGGAN,P.C.
88 West Center Street
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525

^T^^^^^^^^^^^^^

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS E. BROWN, JR. and
MARILYN R. BROWN,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 010600152

vs.
LEE JORGENSEN; JOHN DOES 1-10,
and other persons unknown claiming
title or interest in the subject
property of this action,
Defendant.

Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK
DATE: Aoril 7. 2004

The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on
March 31 and April 1, 2004. Plaintiffs were present with James C.
Jenkins and Defendant was present with Ray G. Martineau and David
S. Cook.
BACKGROUND
The underlying law suit relates to a dispute over a boundary
line. On May 30, 2001, plaintiffs Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and
Marilyn R. Brown (Plaintiffs) filed a complaint seeking an order
that they are the fee simple owners of certain land. They claim
to be the sole owners because they have acquired the property
under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The issue is
straight-forward. Defendant owns the disputed land by deed and
all recorded instruments. Approximately 53 years ago, Thomas E.
Brown, Jr.'s father erected a fence on Defendant's predecessor's
property and plaintiff and his predecessors have been using the
property since then under the belief that the fence was in fact
the recorded property line*. It was not, and so the issue is
whether that use now amounts to acquiring the property under the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
On June 14, 2001, defendant answered and filed a
counterclaim seeking to quiet title in the property. Defendant
claims to be the record owner of the disputed property.
The parties filed motions for summary judgment and partial
summary judgment. On April 6, 2002, the court, Judge Robert
K.
Hilder,
granted partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs

on the third and fourth prongs of the boundary by acquiescence
standard. Specifically, the court concluded that as a matter of
law the boundary was established for a long period of time,
namely 53 years, and that there were adjoining properties. In the
court's June 28, 2002 clarification the court stated that the
remaining issues for trial are the first two prongs of the
boundary by acquiescence standard, which are (i) occupation up to
a visible line marked by monuments, fences or buildings and (ii)
mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary.
Defendant filed motions in limine in May, 2003, and the
court issued its ruling on^ September 22, 2003.
The court ruled
that the burden is on Plaintiffs, who now bear the burden of
showing boundary by acquiescence and that the burden of proof is
by the preponderance of the evidence. The court also ruled it
was premature for the court to decide what Brown may testify to
concerning specific statements. The court concluded that
Defendant's recorded deed is relevant as Plaintiffs would not
need to prove a boundary by acquiescence claim if Defendant's
deed did not show that the property was his but the first and
second prongs of the test remain and sufficiency of Plaintiffs'
evidence in support of those prongs will be decided at trial.
The court also determined that boundary by acquiescence claims
may proceed without meeting the requirements of the statute of
frauds and that the statute of frauds does not apply to boundary
by acquiescence claims. The court also ruled UCA 78-12-7 relates
to adverse possession and does not apply to boundary by
acquiescence claims. The court refused to apply any presumption
that applies to adverse possession to boundary by acquiescence.
The court also refused to quiet title without trial.
At the close of plaintiffs' case defendant moved for a
directed verdict under URCP, Rule 50. The court believes that
when the trial is to the court the proper motion is under Rule
41(b), a motion for a dismissal claiming plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. The court took that matter under advisement and
allowed defendant to present his evidence.
The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument
of counsel, and is fully advised.
LAW
The law surrounding the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
is confusing. The issues are between two adversaries and each
has interests that are worthwhile. On one side is the desirable
feature of being able to turn to recorded instruments to
determine property rights and boundaries. On the other side is
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the also desirable principle of allowing the peace and good order
of society to be served by leaving at rest possible disputes over
boundaries where there has been a recognizable physical boundary
accepted as such for a long time period. This case highlights
those two worthy, competing interests between what appear to the
court to be good and decent people.
It is the policy of Utah law under the cases to apply the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence restrictively, though it is
not unjust in some circumstances to require property owners to
live with what they and their predecessors have long acquiesced
in.
For a court to quiet title in a parcel of property on the
basis of boundary by acquiescence the party claiming title under
the doctrine must establish (1) occupation up to a visible line
marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, (ii) mutual
acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (iii) for a long period
of time, and (iv) by adjoining landowners. If the party claiming
title under the doctrine fails to establish any one of the
elements the boundary is defeated. The court, the Honorable
Robert
K. Hilder,
has previously ruled that the final two
elements have been established by undisputed testimony. To show
mutual acquiescence plaintiffs must show both parties recognized
and acknowledged a visible line and that the parties acknowledge
the line as a demarcation between the properties. Both parties
must have knowledge of the existence of a line as the boundary
line. This element serves the useful and practical purpose where
the parties are seemingly content to recognize a marked line as a
practical boundary between them. When the parties acquiesce they
are precluded from claiming the boundary line is not the true
line. The landowner must recognize and treat an observable line
such as a fence as the boundary dividing the properties. The
acquiescence may be tacit or inferred from evidence. Even mere
conversation between parties evidencing an ongoing dispute or an
unwillingness by one to accept the line refutes the allegation of
mutual acquiescence. The purpose of a fence is relevant and may
be considered and may be determinative because both parties must
acknowledge a particular line to be the dividing line. If the
fence was not intended as a boundary there cannot be acquiescence
in that fence as a boundary line. If a fence is built for
livestock control or some other purpose and not as a boundary, it
is not a boundary by acquiescence. Occupation of land up to a
fence is not sufficient if the adverse owner does not acquiesce
in the fence as a boundary. Evidence of knowledge of recorded
deeds and instrument is not relevant in a boundary by
acquiescence case. See Ault v. Holden,
44 P. 3d 781 (Utah
2002);
Edgell
v. Canning,
916 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1999);
Wilkinson
Family
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Farm v. Babcock,
993 P.2d 229
Ainsworth,
785 P.2d 417 (Utah

(Utah App.
1990).

1999);

Staker

v.

The court finds as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiffs own land adjacent to defendant's land in
Summit County. The parties land is called the Brown parcel and
the Jorgensen parcel. The parcels are off what is called Brown's
Canyon Road, Highway 196, between Highway 32 and Highway 40.
2. Near the north border of the Jorgensen parcel is a fence
which runs along what is now the disputed boundary in a
Southeasterly direction, roughly along the Southern border of the
Brown parcel. It runs from Highway 196, commonly known as Brown's
Canyon Road, to a point approximately 580 feet from the road,
then turns more easterly and runs toward the Weber River for
approximately 1200 additional feet. See exhibit 10 for the most
accurate showing of the property lines established by deed as
well as the fence and ditch relevant to this case.
3. The fence was built by the father of plaintiff Thomas
Brown, T. Edward Brown, in the mid 1940s, between 1943 and 1946,
though there is some testimony it was built before that.
Plaintiff helped his father build the fence, a cedar post and net
and barbed wire fence that requires maintenance and repair on a
regular basis. The fence has remained in the same basic position
since that time, but plaintiffs have repaired and replaced some
of it as recently as the mid-1990s. There has been ongoing wire
replacement and the first approximately 580 feet from the road
have been replaced completely in the mid 1990s, but the old cedar
posts were left in place. The fence has been observable since its
construction, though at various points it may have been leaning
down or covered by sagebrush in places. Defendant testified
contrary to that visibility, but the court, based on several
other witnesses testimony, finds the fence has remained
observable and open since the mid 1940s. Several neighbors and
friends and relatives of plaintiffs so testified and some had
been in the area and recall the fence from the 1940s.
4. The recorded deeds and plats show that the fence goes
across the Jorgensen parcel and encloses approximately 6.94 acres
of land that is shown on the deeds and plats and by certified
surveys as belonging to Jorgensen. That area is the ''subject
property." There is no question that the fence is on land deeded
to and platted as belonging to Jorgensen since 1979. The
recorded property lines are not disputed by plaintiffs. In 1979
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Jorgensen and a partner, Rowell, acquired the Jorgensen parcel
and the partnership dissolved in 1986 and defendant acquired the
parcel from the partnership and has owned it solely since 1986.
The land was acquired, through a title company, from Tracy Land
and Livestock (Tracy) who owned that land and much more in the
area since the mid 1940s.
5. T. Edward Brown died in 1951 and plaintiffs' family took
over the land and have used it to graze cattle and grow hay and
other crops since 1951. Plaintiffs took title in some of that
property, approximately 17 acres, in 1971, and that property is
now known herein as the Brown parcel. He built a house on a
portion of the approximately 17 acre parcel deeded to him. The
fence was always considered by plaintiff to be the boundary line
and plaintiff believed fully that the fence was the property line
to his property and has believed that since the fence was built,
even before plaintiff took title to his 17 acre parcel in 1971.
Before building the house, plaintiffs commissioned a survey which
was done by metes and bounds, performed by Bush and Gudgell.
That document shows in fact the same as the recorded instruments,
before and after 1971, that in fact the property line was not the
fence line. Plaintiff was legally aware of that metes and bounds
survey but did not understand it showed a property line different
from the fence line constructed by his father in the 1940s. His
subjective intent and belief, which the court finds was not
unreasonable, was that the fence erected by his father was his
property line.
6. As shown more fully on exhibit 10, the fence line is up
hill from plaintiff's true property line. Defendant's property,
where it adjoins plaintiffs' property, is largely barren and
hilly and mostly sagebrush. Below that fence plaintiff and his
family have used the property to graze cattle and sheep. There
is an irrigation ditch that plaintiff has maintained and improved
which is below, on the downhill side of, the fence. Plaintiff has
also caused some of that ditch to be covered by constructing
culverts. Below that ditch there is a drop off toward the
plaintiff property. The fence runs from the Brown's Canyon road
up the hill, southeasterly, and then toward the river. At about
580 feet, it turns more easterly, toward the Weber River. No one,
neither defendant nor his predecessors, have attempted to use or
occupy the property below the fence line. The fence runs
approximately 1900 feet, or .3 of a mile, and if considered as
belonging to plaintiff, adds property consisting of 6.94 acres to
plaintiff's 17 acre parcel. At the road, the fence is
approximately 167 feet from the true property line, that distance
expands to approximately 250 feet approximately 500 feet from the
road, and it then decreased to approximately 69 feet at the far
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south end. It is thus a "strip" of property somewhat irregular
but averaging perhaps 175 feet wide and it is approximately 1900
feet in length. That 6.94 acres is the disputed property. An
irrigation ditch is in the strip, and that ditch originates at
the river and flows northward, obviously downhill, toward the
road and then under the road.
7. On or about July 1, 1999, defendant wrote a note to
plaintiffs telling them they had built a fence on defendant's
land and it should be removed. Since at least that time the
boundary line has been in dispute. Plaintiff immediately
contacted defendant and they attempted to resolve the issue but
were not able to do so. Plaintiff commissioned a survey shortly
after that contact. That informal survey is consistent with the
1971 metes and bounds survey that was accomplished so plaintiffs
could build their home. Plaintiff was originally told in 1994
that in fact the true property line probably ran through his
home, but that was in error and the true line, as shown on
Exhibit 10, is west of plaintiff's home. Plaintiffs have refused
to remove the fence and filed this action to quiet title
asserting the disputed land is owned by them under the doctrine
of boundary by acquiescence.
8. Defendant bought 195 acres in 1979 as an investment. He
inspected the property and observed fence posts but the court
finds the fence was visible. Defendant at that time was not
aware by survey of the exact and true boundary line but he
assumed the line was below the fence and irrigation ditch and
utilized what he believed was a "road" on his property just below
the irrigation ditch and envisioned that would be the access to
his property. In fact the court finds it was not a "road" but
was used to work along the irrigation ditch. It could be
accessed from Brown's Canyon road but a fence and gate from
Brown's property ran to the disputed fence approximately 500 feet
from the road as shown on exhibit 10.
9. The predecessors of defendant ran livestock on the land.
There is no evidence Tracy ever saw the fence or knew of its
existence. There was no evidence adduced whatever that Tracy
used or occupied the land on the downhill side of the fence.
10. Defendant took surveyors and potential buyers along that
area of the ditch but the court finds that was not occupation of
the land.
11. Defendant, in anticipation of possible buyers of some of
his land, commissioned a survey in 1994, and that survey showed
that the true line was not the fence line. Defendant always
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believed the true line was not the fence, which he claims he did
not even see except for a few old leaning cedar posts, but that
the boundary line was downhill by the ditch and by the Brown home
where it was marked with a flag when defendant first inspected
it. The survey he commissioned in 1994 showed he was correct
about the true boundary line, that it was not the fence line.
The surveys are consistent with all the recorded instruments and
show the true boundaries as shown on Exhibit 10. That survey was
done by one France, who talked with plaintiff about the results
of that survey, along with the real estate broker McPhie. France
told plaintiff that plaintiff's house was probably partly on the
Jorgensen property. That was incorrect, but plaintiff was told
that.
12. Plaintiff erected a wooden rail fence along the Brown's
Canyon Road, to replace a wire fence across the front of his
property, but ran it across the "road" or disputed approximate
167 feet to the disputed fence in the late 1990s. Plaintiff does
not call that area by the Hitch, the disputed area, a "road" but
the court finds vehicles could drive onto it before the wooden
rail fence was installed, though it was not intended as a road.

ISSUES
Here, as found, each party operated in good faith. In
actual fact the true boundary line was as shown on the recorded
records, deeds and plats. There was a 1971 survey that showed
the fence was NOT the boundary line, but that was not understood
by plaintiff. Thus, the issue becomes difficult for the court.
That is especially so since two recent appellate court decisions
are somewhat in conflict. There are recorded documents and
surveys showing actual boundary lines. The parties are
constructively charged with that knowledge, thus each party knew
the boundary line and there was no legal uncertainty though there
was practical uncertainty by plaintiff. Defendant then did
nothing, by word or deed, to object to a visible fence. The
issue thus becomes whether that inaction as to a fence, which was
erected for a purpose not shown by the evidence, but by inference
was erected not to establish a boundary line but for some other
purpose, amounts to mutual acquiescence in that fence as a

boundary.
Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
7

1. Plaintiffs had constructive knowledge of the true
property line since they commissioned a survey in 1971. Prior
deeds and documents showed the true boundary line as well. Those
instruments showed that the true property line, according to
deeds and plats and surveys, was not the fence line constructed
by plaintiff's father. Plaintiff believed, however, that the
fence line was the demarcation of the property line.
2. Defendant is the record title owner of the disputed land.
He also had constructive knowledge of the true property line at
least since 1994 when he commissioned a survey of his property.
He had constructive knowledge since 197 9 when he obtained a deed
with the property description. That 1994 survey showed the
property line not to be where the fence was but the true property
line was according to the deeds and plats of record.
3. Plaintiff has operated under the assumption that the
fence constructed in the 1940s by his father was in fact the
property line.
4. The fence has been open and notorious and visible since
the 1940s. It has on occasion been in disrepair but has been an
observable fence since that time.
5. Plaintiff used and occupied the land as if it were his
and was open and notorious about that use. The fence has served
as an observable and open boundary for a long period of time
between two adjoining land owners. The topography and terrain
made the fence placement a practical place to erect a fence as it
would keep cattle and sheep off of the irrigation ditch and the
lower drop off and off of what was in the 1940s pasture land,
until the home was built in 1971. Given the slope and the
irrigation ditch and the terrain in the area the court infers and
concludes that the purpose of the fence was to contain livestock
and keep grazing livestock of the predecessoi: owner from the
Brown property. The fence was not intended as a boundary line
demarcating the property. There has been occupation of the land
by plaintiffs up to the fence. There has been no occupation by
defendant or his predecessors below or east of that fence.
Defendant's occupation, and that of his predecessors, has been
only up to that disputed fence.
6. There was no mutual acquiescence in the open boundary
line of the fence. This area is rural and defendant visited only
on occasion as he bought the land for investment purposes. He
purchased 195 acres and had possible plans to subdivide the area.
There was no acquiescence in the fence as a boundary. Defendant
did not take any action to oust plaintiff and remained silent as
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relates to plaintiff until 1999. However, defendant did
commission a survey in 1994. To the court that indicates a lack
of acquiescence. If acquiescence is, in the words of Ault
v.
Holden,
"where adjoining landowners are seemingly content to
recognize a marked line o r monument not on the true line as the
practical boundary between them," then the hiring of a survey to
the court conveys the opposite of acquiescence. If defendant
believed and acquiesced in the notion that the fence was the
boundary, he would not have commissioned a survey in this rural
area. That act, though not conveyed directly to plaintiff, shows
a lack of acquiescence. That act showed an unwillingness to
accept the fence as the property line. In fact, however, even if
the surveyor, Wallace France, was not an agent of defendant, that
fact of obtaining the survey was conveyed to plaintiff. Moreover,
the court concludes it need not have been conveyed to the
opposing landowner to evidence a lack of acquiescence, or
unwillingness to accept the fence as a boundary line.
Plaintiffs have to prove mutual acquiescence by a preponderance
of the evidence. Plaintiff argued that unless defendant conveyed
that lack of acquiescence to plaintiff there was acquiescence.
The court disagrees. While most cases evidently show a dispute by
a direct communication with the opposing landowner, the court
concludes that any actions that show an unwillingness to
acknowledge the fence as a boundary are sufficient to defeat the
doctrine. The acquiescence includes plaintiff demonstrating that
both parties "recognized and acknowledged" a visible line. Ault
v. Holden,
44 P.3d at 13.
Defendant's actions in commissioning a
survey were inconsistent with an "acknowledgment" that the fence
was the property line. There seems to be no good reason that the
lack of acknowledgment is only effective if conveyed to the
opposing landowner. The doctrine requires that there be an
actual acknowledgment, and that the parties treat the fence as a
common boundary between the properties. Telling others that the
fence is not the boundary, or hiring a surveyor, seems to the
court to defeat the idea that there is an acknowledgment in a
boundary line. As mentioned, moreover, here plaintiff was aware
in 1994 there was a dispute when France and McPhie talked to him
about the property line being other than at the disputed fence
line.
Further, the seeming inaction of defendant was not shown to
be a tacit approval of the fence as boundary line. The inaction
of defendant and his predecessors was acquiescence in the fence
line for some purpose, but plaintiff has not shown it was an
acquiescence in the fence line as a boundary line.
The court believes plaintiff's arguments seek to in effect
reduce the elements of boundary by acquiescence from four to
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three. Simple occupation of land, up to a visible fence or
boundary, without more, is not acguiescence. Though acquiescence
may be tacit, it must be more than has been shown here by
plaintiff.
As to the predecessor acquiescing, the court rejects
plaintiff's arguments in that regard. First, plaintiff must show
acquiescence, which requires a showing that the other landowner,
defendant's predecessor Tracy, "recognized and acknowledged" the
visible line. There may be an inference that Tracy, running
livestock, saw the fence, but the court concludes that is
insufficient to show Tracy even saw ("recognized") the fence, let
alone acknowledged it as a boundary line. The four elements do
not overlap. Failure to occupy by Tracy, coupled with occupation
by plaintiff, does not amount to acknowledgment the fence is a
boundary.
7. The boundary by acquiescence elements have not been met.
There has been occupation of the land by plaintiffs up to a
visible mark (fence) for a long period of time, over 20 years, by
adjoining land owners, but plaintiffs have not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that there was mutual acquiescence
by the parties in that fence as the boundary line. Defendant
failed to oust plaintiff, but did not agree that the fence was
the boundary. Moreover, given the court's conclusion about the
action of defendant in 1994 amounting to a dispute because of a
failure to acknowledge the fence as a line, there has not even
been an undisputed period of 20 years since defendant's
ownership.
The court indicated the recent cases are confusing. In
Wilkinson,
a Court of Appeals decision, the court said
specifically that knowledge of the true boundary is not
irrelevant. However, that court then quoted language from a case
that has in effect been overruled because it considered the
objective uncertainty element and that has now been eliminated as
an element of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The Utah
Supreme Court said after Wilkinson
in Ault that a landowner must
recognize and treat an observable line as the boundary,
"regardless of whether the^ landowner knows where the actual
boundary lies or whether the boundary is uncertain." To this
court that means that knowledge of the actual or true boundary is
not relevant. Here, there was never any legal uncertainty as to
the true boundary line but there was actual uncertainty. The
court concludes that such facts as these do not allow the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence to grant an interest in
property. The knowledge of the parties as to the true boundary
lines is not relevant under Ault since the elimination of the
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objective uncertainty element.
The appearances of this area, the terrain, and the nature of
the land and its uses by the parties do not allow a resident to
obtain land by merely constructing a fence and then merely
because the absentee landowner does nothing to have the fence
removed claim title to the area up to the fence. The court has
no question that plaintiffs predecessors did not intend to
^appropriate" the land in this way, nor is there any evidence the
fence was erected for any improper purpose. The clear inference
is that the fence was erected to contain livestock and protect a
ditch, and not to establish a boundary line. The plaintiffs'
predecessors' record deeds also showed the actual boundary lines
of the properties. Plaintiff has not shown that defendant or his
predecessors mutually acquiesced for 20 years in this fence as a
property line.
8. The statute of frauds does not apply in this case. The
statute of frauds, UCA 25-5-1, allows creation of an interest in
land by "operation of law." The doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence is the operation of law. If plaintiff had prevailed
in showing all elements of that doctrine an interest in land
could be acquired by operation of law without a writing.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is denied. The court
orders that quiet title be awarded to defendant as in the
recorded instruments.
Defendant is to prepare an order in compliance with URCP,
Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling.
DATE D
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS E. BROWN, JR. et.al.,
RULING and ORDER
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 010600152
vs.
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK
LEE JORGENSEN, et.al.
Defendants.
Date: July 15, 2004
The above matter came before the court July 12, 2004, for
argument on a proposed order and on plaintiffs motion to amend
the pleadings. The court tried this matter March 31, 2004, and
April 1, 2004. The court issued a ruling and order and asked
defendant to prepare an order. Defendant did so and plaintiff
objected to that proposed order, defendant responded, and the
court set the matter for argument. On June 15, 2004, plaintiff
filed a motion to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence.
Defendant opposed that motion on July 7, 2004, and plaintiff
replied on July 9, 2004. The court briefly heard argument on the
motion and took the matter under advisement.
The court is of the belief that the order prepared by
defendant should be signed with slight modification.
The court's ruling was based entirely on plaintiff's claim
to title of the disputed land based solely on a claim of boundary
by acquiescence and defendant's counterclaim to quiet title. The
trial was over who owns title to the land in dispute.
Plaintiff now claims the court can and should allow the
pleadings to be amended because other issues were tried by
express or implied consent. Plaintiff now claims that the court
can and should determine that the evidence established that
plaintiff has a prescriptive easement in the disputed land.
Plaintiff claims the evidence showed plaintiff and his family
have used and maintained the disputed property and they thus have
a prescriptive easement for that continued use.
The court's ruling was NOT based on the doctrine of
prescriptive easement. The evidence to be presented at a any
trial concerning any boundary dispute on any theory, be it
dealing with an easement, adverse possession, or boundary by

acquiescence, would be similar. Evidence would be presented
concerning actual title, surveys, deeds, use of the land and the
manner of that use, and so on. The court does not view this trial
as one where the parties agreed,- explicitly or implicitly, on a
trial concerning prescriptive easement or any other cause of
action other than title under boundary by acquiescence. That
phrase "prescriptive easement" was not uttered during the trial
to the court's recollection, and it certainly was not briefed nor
argued, and the court did not make its decision based on the
doctrine. Whether the evidence "supported" such a claim is not
the question for the court at this point. It may well have
support the claim had the claim been made. It may not. That is
the problem and issue. Had defendant been given a chance to
address and challenge the theory of plaintiff now advanced, the
court has no idea what the facts would have shown and what legal
conclusions may be drawn from the facts presented. Prescriptive
easement mostly focuses on "use" of land. There was indeed
testimony on use by plaintiff, but defendant did not focus on
that because the focus was on who had title to the land.
Defendant has the right to know what claims he is defending
against. Defendant was defending against a claim of plaintiff
that plaintiff had title to this property under a property law
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The court did not
understand, and defendant did not understand, that the evidence
was aimed at establishing an easement of any kind in favor of
plaintiff. The evidence was presented by plaintiff and by
defendant to convince the court that either plaintiff or
defendant had title to the disputed land. The court decided who
had title. The court did not attempt to nor did it decide
anything else.
Plaintiff filed this case in May, 2001, asserting title to
land under one doctrine, boundary by acquiescence. Plaintiff
could have alleged alternate theories of title and easement, or
plaintiff could have amended the pleadings long ago. The court
believes the matter could have been tried on alternate theories,
but if so, defendant could have faced and challenged each or
either. Defendant did not defend against a claim of easement and
usage by plaintiff and the court did not decide such. Defendant
did not amount a defense to the "use" and "continuous" aspects of
prescriptive easement law because he did not know plaintiff was
claiming that. Whether there are defenses to such facts as
plaintiff could present is, of course, unknown. That is why the
court cannot decide if plaintiff has a viable case for a
prescriptive easement based on the facts the parties presented.
The court believes it would be fundamentally unfair to allow
plaintiff to now seek recovery of a different sort, on a
different cause of action seeking certain permissive use rather
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than title, from what was asked for in the pleadings.
Accordingly, the court will DENY the motion to amend the
pleadings.
The court will also direct that defendant prepare a slightly
modified order based on the trial.
The ruling and order of the court may not have set forth the
boundaries of the land but the evidence established without any
real dispute where the deeds and surveys drew the property line.
The court orders that the ruling and order be amended to include
the property description as set forth in the proposed final order
quieting title as the court finds that description is an accurate
description of the properties involved.
The court also did not indicate in its ruling formally that
the fences put in place by plaintiff must be taken down. It
seemed to the court that went without saying. The court has
determined that the property line is according to the surveys and
deeds in evidence. It makes no sense to allow plaintiff to
retain fences plaintiff built on property belonging to defendant.
The order requiring removal of the fence along the roadway, which
fence was installed by plaintiff is to be removed by plaintiff.
The improvement, by plaintiff, to the fence line in existence for
many years is also to be removed by plaintiff.
Defendant is to prepare a new order with the above
modifications and the court will sign such order.
The court has attempted to follow the law in this matter.
The result is not one that appears "fair" in all respects, but it
is one wherein the court has followed the law as best it can and
the result follows. If the court believed that the law did not
answer the questions presented and it could turn to equity, the
result may be different. However, the court believes the legal
principles set forth in its ruling and order are correct and this
result follows.
DATED this
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